Abstract-This paper develops a joint hashing/watermarking scheme in which a short hash of the host signal is available to a detector. Potential applications include content tracking on public networks and forensic identification. The host data into which the watermark is embedded are selected from a secret subset of the full-frame discrete cosine transform of an image, and the watermark is inserted through multiplicative embedding. The hash is a binary version of selected original image coefficients. We propose a maximum likelihood watermark detector based on a statistical image model. The availability of a hash as side information to the detector modifies the posterior distribution of the marked coefficients. We derive Chernoff bounds on the receiver operating characteristic performance of the detector. We show that host-signal interference can be rejected if the hash function is suitably designed. The relative difficulty of an eavesdropper's detection problem is also determined; the eavesdropper does not know the secret key used. Monte Carlo simulations are performed using photographic test images. Finally, various attacks on the watermarked image are introduced to study the robustness of the derived detectors. The joint hashing/watermarking scheme outperforms the traditional "hashless" watermarking technique.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE DESIRE and ability to hide information without invoking suspicion have been present in society for thousands of years. Throughout generations, the techniques used to accomplish these covert goals have varied and, with the current prevalence of digital multimedia data, these methods continue to evolve. In particular, digital watermarking is a current technique which offers a means by which information can be inserted into digital data. To assist in the watermark embedding process, a key is often utilized. For example, the key could specify the location within the digital content at which the watermark is to be inserted. In many applications, invisible watermarking is employed, causing the watermark to be imperceptible in the host data. However, the watermark should also be resistant to attacks, Manuscript received December 16, 2002 ; revised January 7, 2004 . This work was supported in part by NSF Grants CDA-96-24396 and CCR-02-08809. The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Prof. Bruno Carpentieri.
J. Cannons creating a tradeoff between invisibility and robustness. The remaining element of the watermarking process is a watermark detector, which assesses whether or not an input object is watermarked. To maximize detection efficiency, it is beneficial to use the original content in making the decision. This framework is termed private watermarking and is rather expensive in terms of storage and computation. Consequently, blind or public watermarking is also possible, where no portion of the original data is present at the detector. A common application of the watermarking process is within a content protection system. In such a setting, the owner of an original digital object desires the ability to manage its distribution. Increasingly often, the case is being made that, indeed, this responsibility should lie with the content owner or provider, since manufacturers of media players have no commercial interest in implementing security solutions as part of their devices [1] . To achieve the goal of the protection system, watermarks can be utilized to distinguish unauthorized and authorized instances of the content. A typical content protection system features a large number of audio-visual objects, users, and secret keys. Thus, subversion attempts beyond traditional signal processing attacks are a concern. 1) If multiple images are marked using the same key, traditional blind watermarking schemes display security weaknesses to attacks such as the Holliman-Memon attack [2] . To overcome attempts of this nature, different keys should be utilized for different images. 2) Copy attacks, as studied by Kutter et al. [3] , in which a user illegally embeds a watermark derived from one image into a new image, can be attempted to compromise the integrity of the system. 3) If the attacker has access to a detector, repeated queries can be made, thereby permitting the development of a successive approximation strategy (sensitivity analysis attack [4] ) to modify the content such that it is outside the acceptance region. 4) If preloaded, static keys are utilized, any breach of security in the system is inherently difficult to repair, leaving the system open to further attacks.
In order to combat these attacks, it is desirable to have image-dependent keys and a detector that either is operated by the content provider or that at least requires communication with the content provider. Such desirable features are present in a new generation of watermarking systems that allow content tracking and forensic tracking and identification [5] , [6] . In a typical content-tracking application, the content provider watermarks each file sold with a digital signature establishing ownership. The content provider also scans public networks to detect the possible presence of unauthorized copies. Applications, such as content protection systems, motivate the development of reliable watermarking schemes which adhere to these guidelines. A preferable alternative to the expenses of private watermarking would be a process in which the detector need only store a short hash of the original image, where a hash is a function of the original data and a cryptographic key, producing a secret, simplified representation of the content. This solution will be referred to as hash-aided watermarking and may be thought of as an intermediary between private watermarking and public watermarking. In this context, the hash is very small, dramatically decreasing storage requirements relative to a private watermarking system. Perceptual image hashes have previously been used in applications such as authentication, registration, and retrieval. The presence of a hash effectively introduces image-dependent keys, as well as requires communication over a side channel between the content provider and the detector.
The concept of hash-aided watermarking has been discussed by Voyatzis and Pitas in 1999 [7] but has not received much attention in the literature, a recent exception being work by Roy and Chang [8] in the context of database watermarking. This void in the literature prompted the initiation of a quantitative performance study of hash-aided watermarking. A preliminary version of this work appeared in the first author's M.S. thesis [9] . This paper will demonstrate that, when combined with a statistically optimal detection test, the hash function may be designed to dramatically enhance detection performance and, in particular, offer host-signal rejection capabilities. The watermark embedding utilized in the development is multiplicative [10] ; however, extensions to additive embedding are straightforward. This paper first reviews the basic image hashing problem (Section II) and the statistical watermark detection problem (Section III). The new, hash-aided watermarking system is then formulated, and statistical signal detection theory is employed to derive an optimal watermark detector (Section IV). Performance bounds are derived to evaluate this detector (Section V). The difficulty of the watermark detection problem as seen from the perspective of an eavesdropper is also considered (Section VI). Attacks are briefly considered and are specialized to multiplicative white noise (Section VII). The problem of nuisance parameters at the detector is discussed (Section VIII). The watermarking system is evaluated using real-world test images (Section IX). From these analyses and experiments, conclusions are drawn regarding the effectiveness of the hash-aided watermarking framework (Section X).
Notation: Random variables are denoted by capital letters, and their individual values by lowercase letters. Boldface notation is used for vectors. The probability density function (pdf) of a random variable is denoted by , and denotes the probability of a set under this distribution. We denote by the indicator function of a set . The asymptotic equality relation as means that . The notation for specific variables is summarized below.
Original host image. Watermarked image. 
III. MULTIPLICATIVE IMAGE WATERMARKING
This section first summarizes the standard multiplicative blind image watermarking problem [13] . A statistical image model is then described, and the corresponding likelihood ratio test for watermark detection is derived.
A. Basic Image Watermarking Problem
The basic image watermarking problem consists of an embedding process, an attack process, and a detection process. The vector of host data into which the watermark is to be inserted is derived from the host image . A common source of host data is image transform coefficients, and the watermark is inserted into a subset of these coefficients. The discrete cosine transform (DCT) is selected for use in this paper for simplicity, and the full-frame transform is employed to increase robustness against image resizing and other geometric attacks [14] , [15] . A specific watermark vector is to be embedded into the host vector. The multiplicative watermark embedding method generates each element of the watermarked data according to the formula [10] ( 3.1) where is the strength of the watermark embedding. We assume without loss of generality that then typically . Denote by the empirical distribution of the , namely
For the commonly used binary symmetric distribution, we have with equal frequency. Thus, for , and for . The watermarked data are reinserted into the image to form a watermarked image .
With the watermark now embedded into the host data, the watermarked image is released into the public domain. The detector has no knowledge of the manipulations performed on the image, which could include simple image processing operations, or an attacker's attempts to remove the watermark.
When supplied with an image , the task of the detector is to determine whether or not the watermark vector has been embedded. The detector produces a statistic indicating the degree of certainty that the given watermark is present. This statistic is then compared against a threshold to determine a yes or no result.
B. Host Data Modeling
To derive a detector based upon statistical detection theory, a realistic, probabilistic representation of the host data must be determined. First, the DCT coefficients are assumed to be independent. Then, the zero-mean power exponential (PE) distribution (also called the generalized Gaussian distribution) is commonly used to model the distribution of the DCT coefficients of an image [16] . The PE distribution contains two parameters and , with relating to the variance and relating to the heaviness of the distribution tails. The distribution itself is given by (3.3) where is the Gamma function. The parameters and are frequency dependent; the value of usually ranges between 1.5 and 2.2 [15] , [16] . In this paper, we assume that the selected DCT coefficients can be grouped into frequency regions with homogeneous statistics, e.g., the 16 regions described by Barni et al. [15] , [16] .
A slightly better (and also often used) model is the Weibull distribution (3.4) where and . Similar results may be derived under both models by noting that they are exponential families [17] ( 3.5) where , , and
Weibull

C. Statistical Detection for Basic Image Watermarking
Statistical decision theory can be used to formulate a watermark detector based upon a binary hypothesis test, indicating the presence or absence of a particular watermark. The likelihood ratio test is an optimal binary hypothesis test [17] , and, thus, is employed in this paper. Watermark detectors using this technique have previously been developed, specifically for use with the Weibull pdf [13] .
The detection problem is formulated as a choice between two hypotheses (the image does not contain the specific watermark) and (the image contains the specific watermark). Each hypothesis has associated with it a distribution for the data, respectively, and , where are the possibly watermarked coefficients. The likelihood ratio test takes the form (3.6) where is the threshold of the likelihood ratio test. The threshold value can be chosen based on a Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test [17] . 1 The probability of false alarm (falsely detecting a watermark) is given by choosing is true
where is the distribution of under . Thus, if is specified, (3.7) can be solved for . The likelihood ratio test detector is now specialized to the case when the PE or Weibull distribution is used to model the host coefficients. In this situation, the two hypotheses can be written as
Observe that remains in the original family of distributions (PE or Weibull) for all values of . Using (3.5), the distributions under and are, respectively
These distributions take a product form because the data are independent. The log-likelihood ratio is given by (3.10) 1 While optimality in the Neyman-Pearson sense may require the use of a randomized likelihood ratio test, the family of nonrandomized tests (3.6) is optimal in all problems considered in this paper.
to be compared against the threshold . The detector that implements this test will be referred to as the PE or Weibull detector. For the typical case of small , a first-order Taylor series expansion of (3.10) around yields (3.11) i.e., for both the PE and Weibull models, the test statistic is a correlation between the sequence and the transformed data . We have and for PE and Weibull, respectively.
IV. JOINT IMAGE HASHING/WATERMARKING PROBLEM
In this section, the basic watermarking problem is altered to include side information at the detector, resulting in a joint image hashing/watermarking scheme and a new likelihood ratio test. In Section III-A, the data available at the detector are the possibly watermarked image and the watermark vector . This system can be modified to include side information at the detector to increase system performance, as shown in Fig. 1 . Note that yields the basic system of Section III-A, commonly referred to as blind watermarking. Furthermore, when , the original, unmarked image is present at the detector, and the watermarking system is said to be private. Any intermediate case (such as in this paper, where is a hash) can be thought of as semi-blind watermarking.
A. System Description
Our DCT-based joint hashing/watermarking system is diagrammed in Fig. 2 . Its main features are described below.
1) Candidate Set:
The DCT coefficients to be watermarked come from a publicly known region of size , as depicted by the trapezoidal region in Fig. 3 . To increase the security of the watermarking system, a secret subset of the DCT coefficients is defined, and forms a set of candidate locations for embedding. These locations are known by both the embedder and the detector. Let denote the fraction of coefficients included in the candidate set. Note that in the majority of current watermarking schemes , indicating that no secret candidate set is employed.
2) Hash Function: In our joint image hashing/watermarking system, a hash vector of length is utilized, where each takes the form of a 1-bit hash of a corresponding original image coefficient ,
. Specifically where is a subset of , typically a union of intervals
such that . The coefficients for which form the host data set and will be watermarked. Fig. 3 contains a conceptual representation of the different sets involved in the construction of .
Onemaythinkof asabitplaneinaparticularbinarydecompositionoftheoriginalimagecoefficients .Theexpectedfraction of DCT coefficients in the set is (in our original system design [9] , was a semi-infinite interval , where is a significance threshold). To increase the resistance of the scheme to eavesdroppers, the set should depend on the secret key , in which case need also be averaged over . Referring to our conditions in Section II for a good image hashing system, we need: 1) sufficiently wide intervals so that similar images map to similar hash values; 2) sufficiently large to ensure that each feature is perceptually significant; 3) small to provide adequate resistance against collisions. Example 4.1: The specific choice used in our experiments is as follows. Choose a significance threshold for the magnitude of the DCT coefficients to be watermarked. Select and . Select randomly in the interval , according to a uniform distribution with a generating seed known to both the encoder and the detector. For all , let and . Typical parameter values are , , and . For the Weibull distribution with and , this choice of parameters leads to (averaging over ).
3) Operating Methods: Two operational strategies are possible for the joint hashing/watermarking system.
1) The parameters and are fixed. The number is, thus, image dependent and key dependent. These dependencies influence the construction of the watermark itself. One specification technique is for the embedder to be given a sequence (where the follow the distribution ) of the same size as the candidate set, . Each element of this sequence is associated with a coefficient in . Those elements of coinciding with the coefficients of are denoted by . Thus, is of length and forms the actual watermark which will be embedded in the image. With the specification of the key used to generate the candidate set, the key used to generate the set , the hash vector , the sequence , and the possibly watermarked image , the detector is able to extract the appropriate vector of coefficients , which is a sufficient statistic for the detection test.
2) The parameter is fixed but is image dependent and key dependent. The embedder implementation is as follows. A length vector is obtained by a pseudorandom scrambling of the original coefficients. The binary hash sequence is obtained by successively applying the function to the components of this scrambled vector, starting from the first component. This process is terminated when the th "1" in the sequence is obtained. The length of the hash vector at this point is . The watermark is then embedded in the coefficients for which . The watermark detector knows , the key used for the scrambling algorithm, the key used to generate , and the hash vector. It can, thus, extract , the vector of coefficients for which . The first method is slightly more difficult to analyze statistically, hence the second method is used throughout this paper. Note that the second method fails in the case when fewer than coefficients in the original size dataset have magnitude in the set . Under our statistical assumptions on the coefficients, this probability is guaranteed to be very small if .
B. Statistical Detection for Joint Image Hashing/Watermarking
The appropriate likelihood ratio test must now be derived, incorporating the side information in addition to the possibly watermarked coefficients . The pair has a joint distribution under (no watermark present) and a joint distribution under (watermark present). The likelihood ratio is now written as (4.2) where is the threshold of the test.
C. Pulse-Modulated Distribution
Since the PE and Weibull distributions are well suited to modeling the DCT coefficients of an image, either one is a tempting choice for modeling the coefficients when designing the detector. However, in the joint hashing/watermarking scheme, these distributions are not representative of the coefficients selected for watermarking. Here, only the coefficients with magnitudes in the set are watermarked, as specified by the hash. Thus, a new, pulse-modulated (PM) distribution is derived to correctly represent the actual posterior distribution of the chosen coefficients.
Denote by the prior distribution of an unmarked coefficient and consider the binary hash After observing , the posterior distribution of becomes
The PM distribution (4.3) is shown in Fig. 4 for the case when is a PE distribution. To evaluate the likelihood ratio (4.2), we derive Hence, the log-likelihood ratio is given by These results are quite intuitive. In the first case, when the set conditions and are satisfied, is the same as under the PE and Weibull models. When one of the set membership conditions is met but the other is not, one of the hypotheses is impossible, which is indicated by the presence of infinities in the statistic. Note that the probability of having the range conditions fail under both hypotheses is zero. Fig. 5 illustrates the three regions present in the decision statistic when is a semi-infinite interval, . The likelihood ratio test based upon (4.6) will be referred to as the PM detector.
D. Host-Signal Rejection
In conventional spread-spectrum blind watermarking systems, the host signal is a substantial source of noise which adversely affects detection performance. In the case of Gaussian hosts for instance, the probability-of-error exponents are inversely proportional to the variance of the host [18] .
In our hash-aided system, the set can be advantageously designed to reduce host-signal interference. Consider Fig. 6 , which shows the PM distribution versus the scaled PM distribution for a fixed value of . Roughly speaking, the ability to discriminate between and is enhanced when the overlap of these two pdfs is reduced, which occurs when is decreased. However, small also results in a lack of robustness against attacks, so the choice of is a tradeoff. The relative overlap of and depends weakly on the variance of the host signal's pdf, which could even be infinite. A more precise study of the probability of error appears in the next section.
The ability to reduce host-signal interference is reminiscent of the well-known quantization index modulation (QIM) technique, which has a similar property. The hash information tells the PM detector that the host signal belongs to a particular subset of signal space (a union of disjoint cells), and the detector tests for the presence of the watermark conditioned on that information. In contrast, the QIM embedding scheme preconditions the host signal so as to concentrate its distribution on a subset of signal space (typically a union of disjoint cells); the QIM detector must then infer whether the received signal belongs to a particular subset of signal space (also a union of disjoint cells). It is worth noting that the hash-aided watermarking scheme achieves host-signal rejection without preconditioning the host signal.
V. CHERNOFF BOUNDS
Binary hypothesis testing using a likelihood ratio test forms a conceptually simple statistical detector. However, detector performance analysis can often be quite complex. Thus, bounds on the probability of detection (correct detection of a watermark) and the probability of false alarm are often sought. Here, we consider Chernoff bounds [17] , [19] , which are large-deviation bounds and are asymptotically tight in the exponent. The bound provided for is an upper bound, while the bound provided for is a lower bound. These two bounds yield a useful lower bound on the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve ( versus , parameterized by the test threshold ). This bound may be used to evaluate detector performance without the need for the large Monte Carlo simulations which are required when error probabilities are very low. Moreover, the Chernoff bounds may be used to appropriately design the hash function. In this section, Chernoff bounds are formulated for the general case of multiplicative watermarking, and then specialized to the likelihood ratio test detectors based on exponential and PM distributions. Finally, the bounds are evaluated numerically.
A. Chernoff Bounds for Multiplicative Watermarking
As noted earlier, when multiplicative watermarking is employed to insert a watermark into a set of host data, the distribution of each element of the output under is a scaled version of the corresponding distribution under
This property allows Chernoff bounds to be constructed in a general sense, and later specialized to individual distributions.
The Chernoff distance between and is defined as [17] (5.2) is introduced to simplify the notation, and the distribution is defined in (3.2). The value that maximizes is found numerically by solving a convex programming problem [17] . Note that and that by concavity of the Chernoff distance with respect to . Hence, the optimal Chernoff exponent is as if the distribution is symmetric around . The Chernoff bounds on the various probabilities of error are [17] , [19] (5.6)
for all values of between and , where denotes Kullback-Leibler divergence from a distribution to another distribution . Assuming that the empirical distribution in (3.2) converges to a limit, the Chernoff bounds are tight in the exponent as for [17] , [19] . The decision threshold is generally chosen to be proportional to . Then, it follows from (5.4), (5.6), and The Chernoff bounds may now be specialized for a specific modeling distribution simply by substituting the desired into the functional defined in (5.5).
B. Exponential Distributions
For any exponential distribution of the form (3.5), direct evaluation of the Chernoff integral yields 
C. PM Distributions
In this subsection, we find the Chernoff distance for PM distributions, which can be derived from the Chernoff distance associated with each individual pulse. Assume the minimumpulse-width condition for . Let denote the probability of pulse and denote the probability of under , conditioned on pulse being used. For , the Chernoff distance (5.5) is given by (5.15) i.e., it is a geometrical average of the . Given , the ability to discriminate between the two distributions and depends strongly on the size of the support set of . In fact, tends to infinity as . Hence one can achieve host signal rejection by making the pulses more narrow, as illustrated by the example below. . We obtain using (5.18) with , , and in place of , , and .
D. Convexification of Chernoff Bounds
For each value of the exponent , the Chernoff bounds (5.6) and (5.7), in which is viewed as a variable, define a lower bound on the ROC curve . This lower bound is a concave function. The upper envelope of these functions is a lower bound on the ROC curve as well. However, this envelope function is not necessarily concave. Denote by the concave hull of the function . Since (where the last inequality is due to the concavity of ), the convexified function serves as an improved lower bound on the ROC when is nonconcave. We found this technique to be useful for detection problems involving PM distributions, as detailed in the experiments in Section IX.
E. Evaluation of Chernoff Bounds
The Chernoff bounds for the Weibull and PM-Weibull distributions are now compared. For simplicity, a binary symmetric watermark distribution is employed, with . Typical values and are used (see Section IX). The set that defines the hash function is given by , so , while the embedding strength is selected to be 0.1. Figs. 7(a) and (b) show the error exponents (5.8) and (5.9) as a function of the normalized detection threshold for the Weibull and PM-Weibull detectors, respectively. Clearly, the error exponents are vastly different for the Weibull and PM-Weibull cases. Moreover, in the latter case, (respectively, ) as (respectively, ) due to the presence of infinities in the log-likelihood ratio (4.7).
For both the Weibull and the PM-Weibull cases, the threshold maximizes the total-probability-of-error exponent . The normalized Chernoff distances are computed for each coefficient model, using threshold and embedding strength . For the Weibull distribution, this normalized distance is approximately 0.05 while for the PM-Weibull distribution it is approximately 4.88, demonstrating the huge advantage of the PM-Weibull model over the Weibull model. That is, the same detection performance may be achieved using approximately 100 times fewer coefficients for watermarking.
VI. EAVESDROPPER'S DETECTION PROBLEM
Another problem worthy of study is the relative difficulty of the image watermark detection problem as seen by the detector compared to that seen by an eavesdropper. This eavesdropping situation can arise when watermarking techniques are employed in a distributed security system. For example, an eavesdropper may wish to detect watermarked images on the Internet. In another application, a security agency may insert a watermark to flag a suspicious image for further scrutiny by another agency. This mark should be difficult for the intended recipient of the image to detect. In both applications, the eavesdropper attempts to determine whether an object is watermarked without knowing the secret key and hash values.
If our watermarking algorithm is utilized, the eavesdropper knows neither the candidate region nor the sequence . When Operating Method 2 of Section IV-A is used, the eavesdropper knows but not . The eavesdropper observes coefficients ( of which are possibly marked) and evaluates two hypotheses:
which states the data are marked and which states they are not. Under , the distribution of the output is simply given by a product of Weibull distributions. However, under , since the eavesdropper does not know , she assumes a mixture distribution of marked and unmarked coefficients. The mixture is obtained by averaging over all choices of and . To formulate the distribution , a number of probability distributions are first defined unmarked distribution unmarked complementary PM unmarked PM marked PM conditioned on mixture marked PM mixture distribution for in Typically, the two mixture components of are well separated (they overlap only on the boundaries of the intervals forming
). An independent and identically distributed (iid) distribution is assumed for in order to simplify the exposition (and maximize the difficulty of the eavesdropper's detection problem). With the notation above, the distribution of as seen by the eavesdropper under is given by (6.1) with . The Chernoff distance between the distributions under and for the eavesdropper is given by (6.2) As described in Section V, the situation is different for the actual detector, which has knowledge of and the sequence . Thus, for each coefficient, the detector knows which pair of distributions to consider for the two hypotheses. The Chernoff distance (5.4) as seen by the detector can be written as (6.3) A comparison may now be made between the Chernoff distances (6.2) and (6.3) seen by the eavesdropper and the detector, to provide insight into the relative difficulty of the detection problems. With the above formulations and by the concavity of Chernoff distance [17] , it is clear that i.e., the detection problem is more difficult for the eavesdropper than for the detector.
To quantify this effect, the Chernoff distances are evaluated over a range of possible values using the same parameters as in Section V-E. For ease of comparison, the Chernoff distances are normalized with respect to . Again using a binary symmetric watermark distribution, the resulting normalized Chernoff distance curves are given in Fig. 8 . The eavesdropper observes a significantly smaller Chernoff distance than the informed detector (approximately an order of magnitude) and, hence, is much less able to detect the watermark.
VII. ATTACKS
This section considers the effect of attacks on system performance. To illustrate the idea, consider the following multiplicative noise model for attacks:
where are iid distributed random variables following a distribution and are independent of . It is convenient to use a logarithmic transformation to map the problem into an additive model, , where the tilde symbol indicates variables in the log domain ( , etc.). Then, and , etc. Also, define . The binary hypothesis test can be written as (7.2) Also, recall that Chernoff distance is invariant to invertible transformations of the data, so . The PM distributions assumed in the absence of attacks must be replaced with convolutions with . In particular, from (4.3) and (7.2), we obtain and
The Chernoff distance is therefore given by (5.4), where . Greater blurring of the original, discontinuous due to will yield a smaller Chernoff distance.
To illustrate this problem, it is useful to consider attacks of the form , where is any normalized pdf, and is a scale parameter; the attack becomes benign as . Consider, for instance, the triangular pdf whose support set is [ 1, 1] . Fig. 9 gives the Chernoff distance in the presence of this attack as a function of .
VIII. NUISANCE PARAMETERS
As well as the noise introduced by the attacker, there may be a small number of additional parameters that are unknown to the detector. For instance, the scale parameter of the PE or Weibull distribution is generally not known to the detector, nor is a possible fixed scaling parameter introduced by the attacker (in terms of the attack model in the previous section, we would have , where is an unknown constant). We propose using a noncoherent version of our likelihood ratio detector (4.2), treating unknown parameters such as and as nuisance parameters. The detector is a generalized likelihood ratio test (8.1) where is the threshold of the test. This approach can be used if additional nuisance parameters are present, e.g., a parametric description of a point operation used by the attacker. 
IX. IMAGE WATERMARKING EXPERIMENTS
The previous sections examined the design of optimal detectors and the derivation of performance bounds. Now, these detectors are applied to standard photographic test images to ascertain how well they perform on coefficients which do not necessarily follow the idealized distributions assumed in this paper.
A. Implementation Details
We selected the standard 512 512 Lena and Baboon images as test images and applied the full-frame DCT transform to them. For watermarking we considered only a trapezoidal region of coefficients in the low-mid frequencies: the union of Regions 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 12 (using the notation of [15] , [16] ), which has a total of 5286 elements. We chose for both Lena and Baboon. The Weibull and PM-Weibull distributions are both considered for modeling the DCT coefficients at the detector. A fixed value of is utilized (similar to [15] , [16] ); however, the detector must estimate the distribution parameter . A maximum likelihood estimate is employed within each of Regions 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 12 , and the resulting distribution parameters are given in Table I .
To determine the set , the method described in Example 4.1 is utilized. Since the parameters must be estimated at the detector, the parameter defined in Example 4.1 is taken to be a coarsely quantized version of the average of the parameters over the regions considered. The detector, knowing the candidate values for , can reliably retrieve the value of selected by the encoder. The resulting set is given by . Referring to our description of Operating Method #2 in Section IV-A, is image dependent and key dependent. We obtained on average for Lena (yielding ) and for Baboon (yielding ). In other words, typically 0.75% and 1.05% of the transform coefficients were used for watermarking Lena and Baboon, respectively.
For each detector considered, a Monte Carlo simulation was used to determine the detection and false alarm probabilities and . The simulations were performed over a range of thresholds, with runs for each threshold. A binary symmetric watermark distribution was utilized, and a new watermark and key were generated for each trial.
B. Simulation Results
To present the detection results for the image data, two types of figures are considered for each detector-image pair. The first shows the distribution of the test statistic and the second plots and for an embedding strength of . The distributions of the test statistics are shown for the Weibull and PM-Weibull distributions in Fig. 10 for Lena. For the PM-Weibull distribution, the infinite values which may be present in the statistics are represented pictorially using . For the Weibull distribution, the distributions of the statistics under and are not well separated, indicating the difficulty in choosing between the two hypotheses. On the other hand, the distributions resulting from the use of the PM-Weibull distribution are extremely well separated, with the majority of the trials yielding . The results for the Baboon image were quite similar, suggesting that detector performance should not be highly dependent on the choice of image.
The and curves based on the Monte Carlo simulations are shown in Fig. 11 along with the corresponding convexified Chernoff bounds (refer to Section V-D). Performance is similar for the Lena and Baboon images for both the Weibull detector and the PM-Weibull detector. For both images, the PM-Weibull detector produces detection probabilities within the range [0.99,1] for false alarm values in the range [0,0.01]. The performance using the conventional Weibull detector is dramatically worse. Fig. 11 also provides the ROC for synthetic data generated from the Weibull distribution assumed for Lena and Baboon. The slight discrepancy between the ROC for the synthetic data and for the image data is due to the imperfections of the Weibull model for images.
C. Image Watermarking Experiments With Attacks
This section considers the detection of watermarks in the presence of attacks. Since the development of the detectors of Section IV-B did not include a model of an attack, these detectors are no longer optimal. Therefore, the robustness of these detectors in the presence of attacks is now studied. Two attack methods are considered: multiplicative white triangular noise (MWTN) (see Section VII), and JPEG compression. The MWTN attack is limited to Regions 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 12, since the sequence is known to be embedded in a subset of these coefficients; however, the JPEG attack is applied to the entire image. For the MWTN attack, a more robust version of the PM-Weibull detector is used, namely the infinities in the test statistic are replaced with finite constant values, which are selected as 1 in the experiments.
To evaluate the performance of the detectors based on the PM-Weibull and Weibull distributions, Monte Carlo simulations are performed with the Lena image using 5000 and 1000 trials for each of the attack types, respectively. The mean squared error (MSE) introduced through watermarking is denoted by , while that introduced by the attack is denoted by . The MSE for both attacks is large:
. To illustrate detector performance, plots of the test statistic distributions and ROC curves are included.
The distributions of the test statistics for both modeling distributions are given in Figs. 12 and 13 for MWTN and JPEG compression, respectively. Little change in the Weibull statistic distributions is present, for either attack type, from the corresponding distributions when no attack is present, as seen in Fig. 10 . Thus, the performance of the Weibull detector is not significantly affected by the MWTN or JPEG compression attacks. For the PM-Weibull case, the clipping of infinities in the MWTN case significantly alters the distribution of the test statistics; however, a strong separation under and is still present. Conversely, for the JPEG attack, the majority of the distribution mass is again located at the infinity points. The small influence of the JPEG attack is expected, since the attack is ap- plied to the entire image, causing the marked coefficients to be altered less for a fixed . To further quantify the performance of these detectors, ROC curves are plotted in Fig. 14 . The curves for the Weibull detector are virtually identical to those for the unattacked case, given in Fig. 11 . On the other hand, a slight decrease in performance is present for the PM-Weibull case (particularly for the MWTN) when compared with the data resulting from no attack, Fig. 11 . This decrease is consistent with the change in the statistic distribution previously observed. However, the performance of the PM-Weibull detector remains notably superior to that of the Weibull detector.
X. CONCLUSION
Statistical modeling and signal detection theory provide a structured framework in which optimal watermarking systems can be developed and studied. The encouraging results obtained clearly reveal the potential of joint image hashing/watermarking as a viable means of information protection.
In the setup considered in this paper, the detector has access to side information about the original image in the form of an image hash (1 bit of information for each original DCT coefficient at secret locations), creating a joint hashing/watermarking system. The inclusion of the side information permits the development of detectors which offer extremely high performance, even for very short watermarks . A pulse-modulated (PM) distribution for modeling the selected coefficients was developed as a consequence of the particular hash selected, and the Neyman-Pearson detector was formulated.
Chernoff bounds were derived to analyze the performance of this detector. Evaluation of the bounds revealed tremendous increases in detection performance over hash-free systems. The Chernoff distance as seen by an eavesdropper attempting to detect the watermark was evaluated and found to be low; this result quantifies the increase in difficulty for the eavesdropper's detection problem.
Monte Carlo simulations were employed to analyze the performance of the detectors using data gathered from real-world test images. The PM-Weibull detector displayed vastly superior performance over the Weibull detector, offering decreases of over 95% in false alarm probabilities, for the same detection probability.
Experiments were also conducted to study the effect of multiplicative white triangular noise and JPEG compression. The Weibull detector is nearly unaffected by the introduction of an attack, while the PM-Weibull detector is slightly hindered. However, the PM-Weibull detector still significantly outperforms the Weibull detector. It is likely that further improvements can be obtained by taking attacks into account in the design of the watermark detector; this enhancement is a topic of future research. She is currently pursuing the Ph.D. degree at the University of California at San Diego, La Jolla, where she is a member of the Information Coding Laboratory. Her current research interests include the areas of information theory, data compression, and source coding.
